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COMMENT
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction: The Need for
Ratification
International abduction of children by noncustodial parents increasingly has become a serious problem' due to escalating incidents
of divorce 2 and the accessibility of travel between countries. 3 The
rising number of "child snatchings ' 4 has caused great concern in the
diplomatic and international business communities. 5 The custodial
parent endures emotional and financial hardship during the search
for the stolen child. 6 The real victim of childnapping, however, is
the child, who suffers lingering trauma for years after the abduction. 7
There were 257 cases of parental child abductions from the United States in 1984.
The Office of Consular Services, U.S. Department of State, breaks down the kidnapping
figures by geographic regions: East Asia - 18; Near East - 58; Central and South
America and the Caribbean - 75; Africa - 3; Europe and Canada - 103. In 1984 there
were 1,563 active, unsolved cases at the State Department. Telephone interview with
Monica A. Gaw, Consular Affairs Office, Office of the City Consular Service, State Department (Feb. 4, 1985). The total number of U.S. citizens seeking return of abducted children from abroad has doubled between 1982 and 1984. Telephone interview with Peter
H. Pfund, Esq., Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International Law, State Department
(Feb. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Pfund Interview].
2 There are over one million divorces per year in the United States. Parental Kidnapping.- Hearing on H.R. 1290 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. of the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1980) (statement by Doris Jonas Freed, Chairperson, Comm. on
Custody of the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association) [hereinafter House
Hearings]. The divorce rate has increased 34% between 1970 and 1980 in the United
States. See Comment, American and InternationalResponses to InternationalChild Abductions, 16
N.Y.U.J. Irr'L L. & POL. 415, 416 n.4 (1984).
3 See Jones, Council of Europe Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to the Custody of Children, 30 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 467, 467 (1981).
4 See generally S. KATz, CHLI) SNATCHING (1981).

5 Crouch, Effective Measures Against InternationalChild Snatching, 131 NEw L.J. 592, 592
(1981); Comment, American Responses, supra note 2, at 417.
6 See, e.g., Agopian & Anderson, Legislative Reforms To Reduce Parental Child Abductions,
6 J. Juv. L. 1, 3 (1982) (pain and chaos that pervade life of parent searching for child is
overwhelming); Noble & Palmer, The Painful Phenomenon of Child Snatching, 65 Soc.
CASEWORK 330, 335 (1984) (emotional and physical costs can be "unbelievable").
7 The House noted in its hearings on parental kidnappings:
For the children victimized by snatchings, the resulting psychological (and
sometimes physical) harm cannot be overestimated. Child psychologists report that child-snatching induces fear, guilt, and anger in children, and
causes severe, irreversible, and irreparable psychological harm in many

464

N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. 10

This comment discusses United States8 and international 9 civil

and criminal legislation enacted to deter and punish international
parental child stealing. It also demonstrates the dire need for the
United States to ratify the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, providing for the immediate return

of an abducted child to the custodial parent or institution by the authorities in the abducting country.' 0
I.

United States Responses

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws
drafted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in
196811 in response to the "intolerable state of affairs where self-help
and the rule of 'seize-and-run' prevail."' 2 All fifty states, the District
of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands have enacted
legislation identi3
cal or substantially similar to the UCCJA.'
Prior to adoption of the UCCJA, United States courts generally
refused to recognize and enforce custody decrees of foreign nations
and sister states.' 4 Because courts did not give full faith and credit to
foreign custody orders, noncustodial parents effectively were given
an incentive to steal their children and move to another jurisdiction.
Moreover, when making an initial award of custody or modifying a
prior order, courts would give great weight to the fact that the chil5
dren were present in the forum.'
This refusal to award comity to foreign custody decrees stems
from a 1953 Supreme Court decision, May v. Anderson. 16 The May
Court held that custody decrees are not entitled to full faith and
cases. Indeed, because of its insidious effects on children, child-snatching
has been characterized as a form of child abuse.
House Hearings, supra note 2, at 112 (statement of Sen. Malcolm Wallop, sponsor, Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980).
One child psychologist estimates that between 10% and 40% of the kidnap victims
become seriously disturbed. See Leo, Kidnaped by Mom or Dad, 116 TIME, July 14, 1980, at
41, 41. In the child's later years, specialists have noted that "snatched" children have a
tendency toward antisocial and criminal behavior, including delinquency, prostitution, and
drug addiction. S. ABRAHMS, CHILDREN IN THE CROSSFIRE 77 (1983).

8 See infra notes 11-12, 71 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 115-47 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
I I For a more detailed discussion of the UCCJA, see generally R. CROUCH, INTERSTATE CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO USE AND COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE UNIFORM

CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (1981); S. KATZ, supra note 4; P. HOFF, INTERSTATE
CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLICY, PRACTICE AND LAW
12 UCCJA, Prefatory Note (1968). The UCCJA is reprinted in 9 U.LA. 111

(1982).
(1979),

and in R. CROUCH, supra note 11, at 49.
13 Comment, American Responses, supra note 2, at 429.
14 Id. at 419-20; Agopian & Anderson, supra note 6, at 5.
15 See P. HOFF, INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 10 (ABA

Monograph, Mar. 1982) [hereinafter ABA Monograph].
16 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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credit under the Constitution 17 where the custody determination is
ex parte.'8 The most frequent explanation for not enforcing custody
awards, however, is that such awards are not final, but remain modifiable based on the current best interests of the child. 19 In Ford v.
Ford,20 the most recent Supreme Court decision involving child custody, the Court held that South Carolina was not precluded from
determining the best interests of the child even though Virginia2 already had made a custody determination on the same grounds. '
Foreign national custody decrees apparently were entitled to
even less judicial recognition. 2 2 In Hilton v. Guyot 23 the Supreme

Court established the requisites for recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments. It stated that to be entitled to enforcement, a
foreign judgment must have been rendered by a court having subject
matter and personal jurisdiction, and the defendant must have had
proper notice and the opportunity for a full and fair trial. 2 4 The Restatement of Conflict of Laws 2 5 provides that a valid judgment ren-

after a fair trial in a contested proceeding
dered in a foreign nation
26
will be recognized.
Courts have been reluctant to enforce other courts' custody decrees for three reasons. First, the judge in the later action may disagree with or mistrust the prior award. Judges in the United States
have been particularly unwilling to enforce foreign custody awards
when they suspect the awards are not based on the United States
standard-the best interests of the child. 2 7 Second, there is nationalistic competition between courts, stemming from the belief that a
judge will look more favorably on someone present within the jurisdiction.2 8 Third, judges and attorneys often become involved emotionally in custody disputes, 29 and therefore, awards may not have a
rational basis.
17 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
18 May, 345 U.S. at 533.

19 See Comment, Law and Treaty Responses to InternationalChild Abductions, 20 VA.J. INT'L
L. 669, 673 (1980); Crouch, supra note 5, at 592.
20 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
21 Id. at 194. See also Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 616 (1958) (forum state has at
least as much right to disregard, qualify, or depart from custody judgment as does state
where originally rendered).
22 "Judgments rendered in a foreign nation are not entitled to the protection of full
faith and credit. In most respects, however, such judgments . . .will be accorded the
same degree of recognition to which sister State judgments are entitled." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 comment b (1971).

23 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
24 Id. at 166-67.
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws § 98

(1971).

26 See Bodenheimer, The InternationalKidnapping of Children: The United States Approach,

II FAM. L.Q. 83 (1977).
27 Bodenheimer, supra note 26, at 83.
28 Id. at 84.
29 Id.
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Thus, most United States courts in early cases made de novo
custody determinations when suit was brought in the United States
and the child was present, even where a foreign court already had
made such a determination. For example, in Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski 30 the father came to the United States on a scientific-cultural exchange program from Poland. More than a year later, the father
invited his five-year old son to live with him and learn English. Two
months after the boy arrived, the father notified his wife that he was
going to obtain a divorce, and that he wanted custody of his son. 3 '
The mother, however, was awarded custody of the boy under a Polish judgment.3 2 The United States court held that the Polish court
did not have jurisdiction for custody purposes, because the child was
33
not domiciled in Poland during the proceeding, which was ex parte.
The dissent stated that the majority was rewarding the abducting
parent for his wrongdoing, and that had the mother been a citizen of
the United States, she undoubtedly would have been awarded
34
custody.
Similarly, in Anderson v. Anderson3 5 the father had been awarded
temporary custody by a West German court. The Anderson court held
that it was not required to honor a foreign custody order, but was
"under [an] obligation to decide the question of custody on the merits. . . leaving or placing the custody where the best interests of the
36
child or children require."
Courts in states that recently have enacted the UCCJA have applied full faith and credit and Hilton principles to uphold child custody orders entered by courts of foreign nations.3 7 These courts
have established a tripartite test to determine whether comity should
be granted: (1) whether the foreign court had jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter; (2) whether the procedural and substantive law was reasonably comparable to the law of the forum; and
(3) whether the foreign order was based on the best interests of the
38
child.
In re Lang39 represents the minority view of United States courts
30
31
32
33

296 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1972).
Id. at 433.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 438.

34 Id. at 442-43 (Fickling, J., dissenting).
35 234 So.2d 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (per curiam).
36 Id. at 723. Accord State ex rel. Domico v. Domico, 153 W.Va. 695, 172 S.E.2d 805
(1970).
37 See, e.g., Schiereck v. Schiereck, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 378, 439 N.E.2d 859, cert. denied,
387 Mass. 1103, 441 N.E.2d 260 (1982); Oehl v. Oehl, 221 Va. 618, 272 S.E.2d 441
(1980).
38 Schiereck, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 380, 439 N.E.2d at 861; Oehl, 221 Va. at 623, 272
S.E.2d at 444.
39 9 A.D.2d 401, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1959), afd mem., 7 N.Y.2d 1029, 166 N.E.2d 861,
200 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1960).
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prior to the drafting of the UCCJA. Lang held that New York courts
should recognize and enforce foreign custody awards absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances demonstrating that otherwise the
child will suffer. 40 The parents were divorced in Switzerland, and
custody of the two childern had been awarded to the father. The
mother snatched the children and brought them to the United
States. The court stated:
Adherence to the principle of comity provides the key to rational
disposition for the welfare of the children, . . . inmany, if not most,
custody cases involving self-help. . . .Not only does self-help make
the eventual placement of4the
children an arbitrary consequence but
1
it breeds reprisal in kind.
The UCCJA was drafted to counteract the "self-help" wave of
interstate and international parental child snatchings, by preventing
the abducting parent from legitimizing the wrongdoing by petition42
ing an out-of-state court for a new award of custody.

The UCCJA aims to deter parental child abduction by limiting
jurisdiction of custody matters to courts of one state. 4 3 Section 3 of
the UCCJA permits a court to assert jurisdiction over a custody matter only if: (1) the state is the "home state ' 44 of the child at the
commencement of the proceeding; (2) there is a significant connection between the child and at least one custodian and the state; (3)
the child is physically present in the state and has been abandoned,
or is in immediate need of protection from abuse or neglect; or (4)
no other state would be able to assume jurisdiction under (1), (2), or
(3) .45

An underlying purpose of the UCCJA is to give integrity to custody awards by preventing multiple custody litigation. 46 The UCCJA
attempts to accomplish this goal by encouraging selection of the
most appropriate forum and providing for recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees 4 7 where the foreign court assumed jurisdiction under section 3 or a similar statute.
Other sections of the UCCJA reflect the additional policy of pro40

9 A.D.2d at 406, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 768.

41 Id. at 408, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
42 S. KATz, supra note 4, at 14.

Id. at 4; Agopian & Anderson, supra note 6, at 8.
"Home state" is defined as the state in which the child lived with one or both
parents at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the commencement of the
custody proceeding. UCCJA § 2(5).
45 Id. § 3(a).
46 Id. § I(a)(6). Section 1 provides that the general purposes of the Act are to: (1)
avoid jurisdictional competition between state courts; (2) promote cooperation between
courts so that the state that can best decide the case in the interests of the child has jurisdiction; (3) deter abductions undertaken to obtain custody awards; and (4) facilitate enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees. Id.
47 Id. §§ 13, 15. Section 15(b) provides an added disincentive to a potential child
abductor-the court may require the wrongdoer to pay all necessary expenses of the custodial parent, including attorneys' fees. Id. § 15(b).
43
44
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moting stability in the lives of children from broken homes. These
sections prohibit a second court from assuming jurisdiction once litigation has commenced in another state 4 8 and require the state to
which the abducting parent flees to decline jurisdiction, 49 based on
the "clean hands" principle. 50 The UCCJA also establishes procedures to facilitate cooperation and communication between courts to
the proper forum with all
avoid multiple custody awards and provide
51
available information about the child.
The general tenets of the UCCJA apply with equal force to international custody disputes. 5 2 The drafters believed that the objectives of avoiding jurisdictional conflicts and multiple litigation are
"as strong if not stronger when children are moved back and forth
from one country to another by feuding relatives." '5 3 Consequently,
the only prerequisite to enforcement of a foreign custody order by a
United States court is that the foreign proceeding must have provided all affected parties with reasonable notice and an opportunity
to be heard. 54 This is a lesser standard on which to grant comity
than the Hilton standard, 55 which required that the substantive and
procedural laws be reasonably similar to the law of the forum. One
commentator has opined that United States courts will be compelled
to enforce decrees of foreign states that have radically different custody laws and prerequisites to assume jurisdiction in a custody
56
case.
Some courts have had difficulty determining whether the United
48 Id. § 6. Section 6(c) provides that if a court is notified that a custody proceeding
was pending in another court before the institution of the proceeding in that court, it shall
stay its proceeding and notify the other court of the pendency of its action, so the appropriate forum may be determined in the best interests of the child. Id. § 6(c).
49 Id. § 8. Section 8 has a provision similar to that of § 15, providing that a court that
declines jurisdiction on the basis of the complainant's wrongdoing may order the complainant to pay the expenses incurred by other parties in defending the suit. Id. § 8(c). See
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
50 See R. CROUCH, supra note 11, at xii.
51 UCCJA §§ 16-22.
52 Id. § 23. Section 23 states:
The general policies of this Act extend to the international area. The provisions of this Act relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of other states apply to custody decrees and decrees involving legal
institutions similar in nature to custody institutions rendered by appropriate
authorities of other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard
were given to all affected persons.
Id.
53 Id. § 23 comment, 9 U.L.A. 111, 167 comment (1979).
54 UCCJA § 23 comment, 9 U.L.A. at 168. But see AI-Fassi v. AI-Fassi, 433 So.2d 664,
668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 446 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1984) (court refused to decide
whether Bahamian custody award merited comity, but held it had jurisdiction to modify
the award). "Comity must give way to the interests of the state in exercising parens patriae
jurisdiction over the child with the objective of protecting the recognized best interests of
the child." Id.
55 See supra text accompanying note 38; see also Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note
19, at 678.
56 R. CROUCH, supra note 11, at 40.

19851

INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION

469

States should exercise jurisdiction over a custody dispute under section 3 of the UCCJA. For example, in Brauch v. Shaw57 the court
decided it had jurisdiction where the father had snatched the child
from the mother in England while a custody proceeding was pending
and had taken the child to Rio de Janeiro and finally to New Hampshire. The court assumed jurisdiction because the child had resided
in New Hampshire for nine consecutive months before the father instituted the proceeding and because returning the child to England
58
would cause further disruption in the child's home environment.
The court concluded that jurisdiction was not mandated, however,
and that on remand the lower court could find that there is more
59
information concerning the child's needs and welfare in England.
Conversely, several United States courts have held that they did
6
not have jurisdiction under the UCCJA. 60 A Pennsylvania court '
held that it would not modify a Danish custody award to the mother
even though there was evidence that the mother's father might sexually abuse the children in Denmark. 6 2 The court reasoned that there
was no evidence of physical or emotional harm to the children in the
custodial household, and the parental misconduct of child abduction
outweighed 6 the
possibility of future sexual misconduct by the
3
grandfather.
Other courts have had difficulty determining whether the parties
had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard under the provisions of section 23.64 In Miller v. Superior Court6 5 the California
Supreme Court upheld an Australian temporary custody order to the
father because the mother's attorney had been served with notice of
the hearing, the mother could not be located, and the award was only
66
temporary and subject to modification in Australia.
Although the UCCJA has been effective 6 7 in deterring parental
child abduction for the parent who steals a child with the hope of
57 121 N.H. 562, 432 A.2d 1 (1981).
58 Id. at 574, 432 A.2d at 7.
59 Id. at 574-75, 432 A.2d at 8.
60 See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 278 Pa. Super. 339, 420 A.2d 570 (1980), cert. denied, 454

U.S. 1151 (1982); In re Marriage of Ben-Yehoshua, 91 Cal. App. 3d 259, 154 Cal. Rptr. 80
(1979); Woodhouse v. District Court, 196 Colo. 558, 587 P.2d 1199 (1978) (en banc).
61 Commonwealth ex rel. Zaubi v. Zaubi, 275 Pa. Super. 294, 418 A.2d 729, aff'd, 492
Pa. 183, 423 A.2d 333 (1980).
62 492 Pa. at 206-08, 423 A.2d at 345-46 (Nix, J., dissenting).
63 275 Pa. Super. at 302, 418 A.2d at 733.
64 See Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at 679-80.

65 22 Cal. 3d 923, 587 P.2d 723, 151 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1978).
66 Id. at 930, 587 P.2d at 727, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
67 The late Professor Brigitte Bodenheimer, co-drafter of the UCCJA, stated in 1977:
"Initial experience with the operation of the [UCCJA] has on the whole been positive and

promising. .

.

. The Act is beginning to have a deterrent effect on child snatching."

Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct and Remaining Problems:

Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Excessive Modifications, 65 CAL. L. REv. 978, 1014 (1977). See
S. KATZ, supra note 4, at 30-3 1.

470

N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. 10

being awarded custody in another jurisdiction, it has failed to deter
those who snatch the children with no intention of "legitimizing" the
act.

68

The indefinite scope of the UCCJA's jurisdictional provisions
places discretion in the trial judge and creates the risk that jurisdiction will be assumed inappropriately. 6 9 Sections 12 and 13 are also
subject to discretionary abuse. The UCCJA does not require states
to give full faith and credit to all foreign decrees; it requires only
recognition and enforcement of awards be given in conformance
with its jurisdictional provisions. 70 Thus, a court cannot do anything
if a sister court refuses to recognize its order.
Finally, the UCCJA does not punish the abducting parent. A
court may order the wrongdoer to pay the custodial parent's costs,
but such order is not mandatory. Additionally, the parent who abducts but does not seek court-ordered custody escapes unscathed
under the UCCJA.
In response to the weaknesses in the UCCJA, Congress enacted
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA) 7 1 on December 28, 1980.72 The PKPA was enacted after Congress found
that: (1) custody decisions among the different jurisdictions were
conflicting and inconsistent; (2) an increasing number of cases were
being brought each year; (3) the limited authority of state officials
outside their jurisdictions contributed to the frequency of child
kidnappings and restraint; and (4) children and their parents were
73
being harmed by the growing numbers of child abductions.
74
The purposes of the PKPA are strikingly similar to those established by the drafters of the UCCJA. 75 They include promoting
cooperation among states in recognition and enforcement of custody
and visitation orders, deterring interstate and international child abductions, and avoiding jurisdictional disputes between state courts.76
The PKPA has three main effects on the law surrounding parental child abduction. 77 First, the Act requires all state courts to accord
full faith and credit to prior custody decrees. 78 Second, it provides
68 R. CROUCH,
69 See S. KATZ,

supra note 11, at xiii-xiv; S.
supra note 4, at 32.

KATZ,

supra note 4, at 31.

70 Id.

71 Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), 42
U.S.C. §§ 653-655, 663 (1982), & 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982)).
72 The PKPA was passed as a rider to the Pneumococcal Vaccine Medicare Coverage
Act, H.R. 8406, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The PKPA is found at §§ 6-10 of that Act.
See ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 2.
73 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note.
74 Id.
75 ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 3.
76 S. KATZ, supra note 4, at 121-22.

77 See Agopian & Anderson, supra note 6, at 17; Foster & Freed, A Legislative Beginning
to Child Snatching Prevention, 17 TRIAt., Apr. 1981, at 36, 37.
78 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
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for the use of federal and state parent locator services currently used
to find delinquent supporting spouses. 79 Third, the Act expands the
Fugitive Felon Act to include child snatching
as a felony when inter80
state or international flight is involved.
At the time the PKPA was enacted, only forty-three states had
enacted the UCCJA. 8 1 Section 8, however, was designed to require
all states-UCCJA and non-UCCJA-to recognize and enforce child
custody orders from sister states that were made in conformity with
the jurisdictional provisions of section 8(c).82 The jurisdictional provisions of the PKPA are similar to those of the UCCJA. 83 The PKPA
provides that jurisdiction to determine custody rests in either: (1)
the "home state;"'84 (2) a state with which the child has significant
connections, if there is no home state; (3) a state in which the child is
physically present if an emergency situation exists; or (4) if no other
state appears to have jurisdiction, the state where the action was
85
commenced.
The primary difference between the jurisdictional provisions of
the UCCJA and the PKPA is that the PKPA requires the home state
to assume jurisdiction. Only when there is no state that meets the
definition of home state may a state with a significant connection
with the child assume jurisdiction. 8 6 Under the PKPA, to have jurisdiction to modify an existing decree, a court must be in the state that
issued the decree initially, or if that state declines jurisdiction, it
must be a state that meets the jurisdictional requirements of section
87
8(c).
Section 9 of the PKPA expands the use of the federal parent
locator service (the FPLS), within the Department of Health and
Human Services, to aid in locating the abducting parent and missing
children. 88 The FPLS is a computerized information system that
79 42 U.S.C. § 663(17) (1982).
80 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982).
81 ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 3.
82 See S. KATZ, supra note 4, at 122; ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 3.
83 See Agopian & Anderson, supra note 6, at 18; Comment, American Responses, supra
note 2, at 433.

84 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (b)(4) (1982) defines "home state" in language identical to that
of the UCCJA. Compare with definition of "home state" in § 2(5) of the UCCJA, supra note
44.
85 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1982).
86 Agopian & Anderson, supra note 6, at 18; Comment, American Responses, supra note
2, at 433.
87 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (1982). Section 1738A(e) also provides that before a custody
determination can be made, all interested parties must have been afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. Section 1738A(g) further provides that state
courts are encouraged to award attorneys' fees and expenses in the case of abduction or
when the court deems proper. Id.

88 42 U.S.C. § 663 (1982). Section 663 applies to proceedings to determine custody
and visitation rights, as well as to proceedings to enforce or modify those rights, and to
criminal law proceedings for kidnapping or custodial interference. ABA Monograph, supra

note 15, at 5.
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amasses data from various federal agencies, including the Social Security Administration. 89 Parents cannot apply directly to the FPLS,
but must petition the court for a request to use the service. The
FPLS is not a comprehensive system because it is based on social
security numbers. If the abducting parent changes his identity and
social security number, a search on the FPLS computer is futile. 90
The third major provision of the PKPA authorizes the federal
government to assist in the location and apprehension of fugitives
from state kidnapping charges. 9 ' The Justice Department and the
FBI will become involved, however, only when the state has felony
parental child abduction9 2 laws and has issued a warrant for the abducting parent's arrest.
The Justice Department and the FBI have been reluctant to become involved in custody disputes. 9 3 Concerned by the hands-off
approach of federal officials, the House Judiciary Committee in September, 1981 instructed the Justice Department to implement the
PKPA fully. 9 4 Once the Justice Department becomes totally involved

in assisting in locating and extraditing parental child snatchers, the
UCCJA and PKPA should complement each other effectively to deter
parental child abductions and promote stability in the resolution of
95
custody disputes.
Thus, when children are brought into the United States by an
abducting parent, the UCCJA should provide the basis for enforcing
a foreign court order absent extraordinary circumstances. When
children are taken from the United States, however, it is less likely
that a United States custody order will be enforced abroad. 96 Ultimately, the parent must convince a foreign court to order the return
of the child because the7 foreign court is likely to apply its own law in
9
determining custody.
89 ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 5; Agopian & Anderson, supra note 6, at 19.
90 ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 5-6. The information on the FPLS computer is
updated annually, so the address obtained may not be the current address of the abducting
parent. Id.
91 18 U.S.C. § 1073 note (1982). This provision was necessary because the Justice
Department has refused to apply the Fugitive Felon Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982), to parental child abduction cases. Agopian & Anderson, supra note 6, at 20.
92 As of 1982, 40 states had made parental child abduction a state felony. Section 10
of the PKPA will not apply to the remaining 10 states unless the abducting parent can be
charged with a felony. Agopian & Anderson, supra note 6, at 20.
93 Foster & Freed, supra note 77, at 37; ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 8.
94 ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 8; Agopian & Anderson, supra note 6, at 20. See
Oversight HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,

1st Sess. 3 (1981).
95 The PKPA, however, works only to locate and apprehend the absconding parent.
When the parent is located and extradited, the child will not be returned automatically.
The custodial parent must seek the return of the child under the UCCJA or the PKPA,
according to applicable state procedures. ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 7.
96 Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at 671 & n.7.
97 S. ABRAHMS, supra note 7, at 108-09.
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Most countries adhere to the principle that their courts have jurisdiction to render custody decisions despite a foreign judgment, if
the child is present in that country. 98 Although the "best interests of
the child" standard is applied in most countries,9 9 the United States
cannot compel a foreign country to honor a United States award
based on the same standard.10 0
For example, in In re E. (D) (An Infant),10 ' on the basis of the

best interests of the child, the British court awarded custody to the
child's aunt and uncle even though a New Mexico court had awarded
temporary custody to the child's natural mother.10 2 Similarly, in In
re C (minors)103 the English court awarded custody to the natural fa-

ther, an English citizen, while a custody suit brought by the stepfather was pending in California. While acknowledging that California
properly had assumed jurisdiction, the court made the award on the
ground that the California court would have awarded custody to the
worker's report pointing
natural father, based on a California social
04
parent.1
preferred
the
as
to the father
The problem has become so exacerbated that a Minnesota
court 10

5

refused to grant an abducting parent visitation rights until

the parent obtained a German declaratory judgment acknowledging
that American courts had exclusive jurisdiction to determine custody
matters in the case, and that German courts had a duty to enforce the
Minnesota court's award of permanent custody to the mother.
There is little the United States Government can do in these situations. In a letter to all consular posts, the State Department stated
that consuls must attempt to locate the missing child and ascertain
the child's health and circumstances. 10 6 Once the child is located,
the post's duty is to interview the child or have a local official pay a
98 Dep't of State, Assistance in Child Custody Disputes, reprinted in 61 MICH. B.J. 158

(1982) [hereinafter Dep't of State Notice].
99 Zukerman, Support and Custody of Children-International and Comparative Aspects, INT'L
BAR Ass'N TWELFTH CONFERENCE REPORT 162, 169 (1968). Most jurisdictions state that
parents have equal rights to custody; nevertheless, the tender years doctrine seems to pre-

vail, unless the mother is very unfit. Id. In several countries, the father has the paramount
right to custody (e.g., France, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Portugal). Id. Other factors
include parental preference of older children, fitness of the parents, and whether an order
has been issued elsewhere. Id. at 170-7 1. Although this report is somewhat dated, recent
case law demonstrates its continued validity. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying
text.
100 Dep't of State Notice, supra note 98, at 158.

101 [1967] 1 Ch. 287.
102 Id. at 301 (special circumstances outweigh comity considerations).
103 [1978] 2 All E.R. 230.
104 Id. at 238.

105 Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 412 (Minn. 1982), cert. denied, 460 S.
Ct. 1037 (1983). Seealso McKee v. McKee, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 657, 666 (best interests of child
require that custody be awarded to abducting parent).

But see In re H (infants), [1966] 1

W.L.R. 381, 389 (duty of courts in all countries to do all they can to ensure that wrongdoer
does not gain advantage by his wrongdoing-American court proper to decide case).
106 Transmittal Letter OCS-1, Sept. 4, 1979, reprinted in Nash, Contemporary Practice of
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call to the child's residence. The post should inform local authorities
that the United States interest "is not necessarily in the return of the
child but in the health and welfare of a minor United States citizen. ....

"107

In addition to locating the child, the consular officer

should provide the custodial parent with a list of attorneys, outline
custody procedures, and "be as helpful as possible without acting as
legal advisor .... ",108
Thus, the custodial parent must resort to the complicated and
costly process of obtaining return of the child via the laws of a foreign country.' 0 9 Similarly, the United States Government will not
assist foreign governments by extraditing child abductors found in
the United States or give assistance to United States citizens who
seek to have a child snatcher extradited to the United States.1 0
A custodial parent may be able to avoid an international child
snatching by preventing the other spouse from obtaining a passport
in the child's name. This prophylactic measure is accomplished by
filing with Passport Services a copy of a custody order with provisions prohibiting removal of the child from a particular jurisdiction
without court approval."' If, however, a parent absconds with the
child to a jurisdiction with an open-door policy to United States citizens, such as Mexico or Canada, and the abducting parent applies for
a passport there, there is nothing the custodial parent can do except
obtain a court order in that country enforcing the United States
judgment. 112
Thus, American solutions to international child snatching are
not completely satisfactory. In increasing numbers, noncustodial
parents successfully kidnap their children and move overseas without
sanction. The United States Government is powerless to help the
custodial parent in these situations, and thus, the suffering that surrounds parental child kidnapping continues. There have been sevthe United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 158, 166 (1980).

See P. HOFF,

supra note 11, at 10-6.
107 Nash, supra note 106, at 167.
108 Id. Under the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974), (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)), a consular post may report on the whereabouts and the welfare of all U.S. citizens under 18 to either parent, including the child's
address. The officer may not disclose the name or relationship of the person with whom
the child resides, however, if that person is an American citizen. Id. at 1898, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b)(18).
109 S. ABRAHMS, supra note 7, at 108-09.
110 See House Hearings,supra note 2, at 116; ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 17. The
"dual criminality" standard employed by the United States in extradition treaties prevents
U.S. assistance in extradition of child abductors to foreign governments because parental
child snatching is not a federal felony. Id.
1'' 22 C.F.R. § 51.27(d) (1984). For a complete discussion of the procedures, see
ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 21-22. See also Mitchell v. Mitchell, 252 Ga. 46, 49, 311
S.E.2d 456, 459 (1984) (upholding custody order provision proscribing procurement of
passports for the children).
112 ABA Monograph, supra note 15, at 21-22.
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eral attempts to resolve this problem by international agreement."1 3
The next section of the comment discusses two recent international
4
treaties that offer alternative solutions to the problem."
II.

International Responses

On May 20, 1980, the European Convention on Recognition
and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Custody of Children and
on Restoration of Custody of Children (the Strasbourg Convention)
was opened for signature." 5 The Strasbourg Convention establishes standards for recognition and enforcement of child custody
16
decrees made by the member nations of the Council of Europe."
The Council recognizes that international child stealing is a serious
problem and seeks to establish procedures for the return of snatched
children "to provide greater protection of the welfare of the

children."' 17
The Convention provides for the creation of Central Authorities
that cooperate to execute the purposes of the treaty." 8 Article 5 sets
out the duties of the Central Authorities,' '9 which include locating
the child, enforcing a member state's custody award, and returning
the child to the custodial parent through whatever means are necessary including court proceedings.' 20 The Central Authority must
bear the burden of all costs incurred on an applicant's behalf except
2
the cost of the child's repatriation.' '
Article 7 provides that "[a] decision relating to custody given in
a Contracting State shall be recognised and, where it is enforceable
in the State of origin, made enforceable in every other Contracting
113 See Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at 688.
114 Two earlier Conventions were signed in the 1960s: the Draft Convention on the

Recognition of Orders on the Custody of Infants, adopted in 1960; and the 1961 Hague
Convention concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in Respect of
the Protection of Children. The Draft Convention has never been ratified, while seven
European countries ratified the 1961 Convention. Both treaties based jurisdiction on "nationality" in lieu of "home state," upon which jurisdiction is based in the Strasbourg and
Hague Conventions.

For a discussion of these early treaties, see Eekelaar, International

Child Abduction by Parents, 32 U" TORONTO L.J. 281, 303-04 (1982); Comment, Treaty Respouses, supra note 19, at 688-89.
1 15 Explanatory Report on theEuropean Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions
Concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children 6 (Council of Europe

1980) [hereinafter Explanatory Report]. The Strasbourg Convention is reprinted at R.
CROUCH, supra note 11, at 115.

116 See Comment, American Responses, supra note 2, at 436-37. The Strasbourg Convention was signed by 15 nations but, as of 1982, had been ratified only by France. Id.at 437.
The Convention becomes effective three months after three countries ratify it. Strasbourg
Convention, art. 22(1).
117 Strasbourg Convention, preamble.
118 Id.arts. 2(1), (3).
119 Id.art. 5.
120 Id.art. 5(1).
121 Id.art. 5(3).
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State."' 12 2 Thus, the general premise of the Strasbourg Convention
is that member nations must recognize and enforce their respective
custody decrees unless one of the specified grounds for refusal to
12 3
recognize and enforce is applicable.
Article 8, for example, requires that at the time of the "improper
removal,' 2 4 a country's Central Authority must return the child if:
(1) the sole nationality of the child and his parents is of that nation;
(2) the child's habitual residence 12 5 is in that State; and (3) application was made to the Central Authority within six months of the
26
wrongful removal. 1
If the criteria of article 8 are not met,1 27 article 9 will apply if
application to the Central Authority is made within six months of the
abduction. Article 9 lists several grounds under which a contracting
state may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign custody decree.1 28 Such refusal is justified if the defendant was not given adequate notice to enable the preparation of a defense, unless service
was not effected because defendant concealed his or her whereabouts. 129 It is also permissible to refuse to recognize a foreign custody decree where there is insufficient connection between the child,
the parents, and the court of origin,' 30 or if the original custody decree is incompatible with the decision of the requested state.' 3 ' Review of the merits of the requesting court's decision, however, is
l3 2
proscribed by the Convention.
Finally, if neither article 8 or 9 applies, the requested court may
122 Id. art. 7.
123 See id. arts. 8-10; Jones, supra note 3, at 469.
124

Improper removal means the removal of a child across an international frontier in breach of a decision relating to his custody which has been given in a
Contracting State and which is enforceable in such a State; improper removal
also includes:

i. the failure to return a child across an international frontier
of a period of the exercise of the right of access to this child or at
any other temporary stay in a territory other than that where the
exercised;
ii. a removal which is subsequently declared unlawful within
ing of Article 12.

at the end
the end of
custody is
the mean-

Strasbourg Convention art. 1(d). Right of access is the international term for visitation
rights. See Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at 690 n.137.
125 Habitual residence is not defined in the Strasbourg Convention and is to be determined in accordance with the laws of each member state. Explanatory Report, supra note 115,
at 8
15.
126 Strasbourg Convention, art. 8(l)(b). Article 8(2) provides that if the child cannot
be returned without resort to judicial proceedings, none of the grounds for refusal encountered in the Strasbourg Convention apply. Id. art. 8(2).

127 For example, if the parent and child are not of the same nationality, or the contracting state is not the child's habitual residence, article 9 applies. See Comment, American
Responses, supra note 2, at 437-38.
128 Strasbourg Convention, art. 9(1).
129 Id. art. 9(l)(a).
130 Id. art. 9(l)(b).
131 Id. art. 9(l)(c).

See Comment, American Responses, supra note 2, at 438.
132 Strasbourg Convention, art. 9(3).
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refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign custody decree for the reasons set out in article 10.133 The requested state may refuse to return the child if the effects of the requested state's decision "are
manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of the law"
of the requested state,' 34 or if changed circumstances, including passage of time, have caused the requesting3 5 state's decision to be no
longer in the best interests of the child.'
A state also may refuse to repatriate a child if the child has
greater connections with the requested state than with the requesting state,' 3 6 or if a decision by the requested state would be incompatible with a decision made in the requested state or in a third state
that is enforceable in the requested state.' 3 7 These grounds for refusal are important because a contracting state may make a reservation under article 17, so that the article 10 grounds for refusal will be
38
applied to article 8 and 9 situations.'
The Strasbourg Convention mandates the return of a child abducted prior to the entry of a custody decree if the custodial parent
obtains a decree in the preremoval forum. 13 9 Article 18, however,
allows contracting states to make reservations so as not to be bound
by article 12.140
The Strasbourg Convention is a complex document with many
exceptions and limitations. Commentators have criticized the Strasbourg Convention because its complicated procedures make uniform
4
interpretation and enforcement difficult, if not impossible.' '
Others have expressed concern that the broad exceptions to the
Strasbourg Convention undermine
its effectiveness by giving the
42
courts too much discretion.
The Council of Europe believed that courts in any jurisdiction
would award custody to the same parent once all the facts were
presented. The Council found that the most significant problems
faced by applicants were tracing children in the abducting states and
bringing actions for return of the children before the proper authori133 Id. art. 10(l). This article applies when there has not been an improper removal,
or if the application for enforcement was made more than six months after an improper
removal. Explanatory Report, supra note 115, at 13 46.
134 Strasbourg Convention, art. 10(1)(a).
135 Id. art. 10(l)(b).
136 Id. art. 10(l)(c).
'37 Id. art. 10(1)(d). See Explanatory Report, supra note 115, at 14-15
51.
138 Strasbourg Convention, art. 17(1). Article 17(2) subjects a state that invokes the

article 17(l) reservation to reciprocal treatment when it is the requesting state. Id. art.
17(2).
139 d. art 12.
140 Id. art. 18.
141 See, e.g., Comment, American Responses, supra note 2, at 445-46; Eekelaar, supra note
114, at 305.
142 Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at 691.
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ties. 14 3 Therefore, the Council emphasized the role of the Central
Authorities, and opted to exclude provisions making return of the
wrongfully removed child mandatory. 144 By giving the judge discretion to order the child to remain in the abducting state, the problem
of having to return the child to a situation that would endanger the
child's health and well-being was avoided." 4 5 Furthermore, the
Council believed that discretion would not be abused, because the
requesting state's courts could retaliate by keeping a child in its juris14 6
diction contrary to the abusing court's custody order.
The same year the Strasbourg Convention was presented for
signature, another Convention was discussed. In October 1980 at
the Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague Convention) unanimously was
approved. 147 The Hague Convention is designed primarily to facilitate the prompt return of a child under age sixteen148 who is wrongfully removed or retained,14 9 and to ensure that the rights of custody
and access in one member state are respected in all other contracting
50
states.1
The Hague Convention further states that the rights of custody
that the abductor has breached may arise by judicial decision or by
reason of an agreement having legal effect under the laws of the requesting state.' 5 ' Thus, unlike the Strasbourg Convention, the
Hague Convention applies to international abductions that occur
before or after a judicial award of custody has been made. 152 The
wrongfulness of the conduct is determined by the laws of the country
in which the child habitually resides.15 3 The child abductor may be a
143 Jones, supra note 3, at 470.
144 Id. at 472-73.
145 Id. at 474.
146

Id. at 474-75.

147 The Hague Conference consisted of 23 nations, including the United States, plus

representatives of 6 nations, attending as nonvoting delegates. See Agopian & Anderson,
supra note 6, at 22. The Hague Convention is reprinted in R. CROUCH, supra note 11, at 93.
148 Hague Convention, art. 4. It was thought that a child of 16 could object to his
being kidnapped. See Eekelaar, supra note 114, at 316.
149 Article 3 defines wrongful removal or retention as a breach of rights of custody attributed to a person ... under the law of the State in which the child
was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
. . . at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised
...or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
Hague Convention, art. 3.
150 Id. art. 1. See also Agopian & Anderson, supra note 6, at 23; Bodenheimer, The
Hague Draft Convention, on International Child Abduction, 14 FAM. L.Q. 99, 102-03 (1980); S.

supra note 7, at 118.
Id. art. 3(b).

ABRAHMS,

151

152 See Bodenheimer, supra note 150, at 104; Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19,
at 693; Eekelaar, supra note 114, at 310.
153 Hague Convention, art. 3(a). It has been suggested that "habitual residence," as
used in the Hague Convention, approximates "domicile." See Bodenheimer, supra note
150, at 104 n.25.
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parent, an agent of the parent, or any other person who wrongfully
assumes custody of a child.' 54 Applicants for relief under the Convention can be the natural or adoptive parents, guardians, or any
55
person who has obtained custody by court order.
The Hague Convention provides for cooperation among gov56
ernmental authorities through the use of Central Authorities.,
Like the Strasbourg Convention, the Hague Convention states that
Central Authorities shall take "all appropriate measures" to locate
an abducted child, provide information regarding the social background of the child and the laws of the requesting state, attempt to
secure voluntary return of the child, and if no amicable resolution is
possible, to initiate legal proceedings and provide legal aid and advice to the applicant.' 5 7 Article 26 provides that the Central Authorities must bear their own administrative costs and the costs of all
legal proceedings, but may request reimbursement for the expenses
58
incurred in repatriating the child.'
Custodial parents may apply for assistance to the Central Authority of the country of habitual residence or to the Central Authority of the abducting nation. 159 Victimized parents, however, may
bypass the Central
Authority and institute their own legal proceed0
ings directly.

16

Once a Central Authority receives an application, its responsibility is to transmit the application to the Central Authority of the abducting state as soon as the child's location is ascertained. 16 l The
Central Authority of the State where the child is located is obligated
to attempt to negotiate the voluntary return of the child. 162 If it is

unsuccessful, it must expeditiously initiate legal proceedings for the
return of the child, and the judicial authority must reach a decision
within six weeks from the date of commencement of the
proceeding.

16 3

The six-week limit on legal proceedings should be easy to com154 See Bodenheimer, supra note 150, at 104; Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19,
at 693-94.
155 An institution, such as a child care center, also qualifies as an applicant under the
Convention. See Comment, American Responses, supra note 2, at 441-42 n.181;
Bodenheimer, supra note 150, at 104-05.
156 Hague Convention, arts. 6, 7.
157 Id. art. 7. But see id. art. 27 (Central Authority not bound to accept an application if
the requirements of the Convention not met).
158 Id. art. 26. Article 26 also provides that a contracting state may make a reservation
under article 42 and thereby refuse to assume the expenses of any legal proceedings. Id.
159 Id. art. 8. Article 8 requires the submission of certain information about the missing children from the applicants. Id. Attached as an appendix to the Convention is a
model form for optional use by the Central Authorities.
160 Id. art. 25.
161 Id. art. 9.
162 Id. art. 10.
163 Id. art. 11.
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ply with because the Hague Convention does not permit a decision
on the merits of the custody dispute.' 64 The purpose of the Convention is to restore the child to the status quo before the abduction,
and therefore, the court has a limited function.1 6 5 To order the immediate return of the child, the court need only find that the child
was removed wrongfully, and that the proceedings were instituted
within the Convention's one-year statute of limitations.' 6 6 If a year
or more has passed, the court may in its discretion order the immediate return of the child unless it finds
that the child has become accli67
mated to the new environment.'

Although harsh, the one-year statute of limitations was implemented for two reasons. First, an aggrieved parent usually acts immediately to gain the return of the child.16 8 "Failure to act quickly
would indicate that the parent was ambivalent about or acquiesced in
the assumption of custody by the abductor."' 6 9 Second, children assimilate quickly into a new culture, and therefore, removal of a child
from an abducting parent after a year would cause a serious disruption in the life and stability of the child.' 70 This assumption, however, overlooks the destabilizing effects of a nomadic abducting
parent who does not remain in any one place long enough for a child
to become acclimated.'

71

Articles 13 and 20 of the Convention provide the limited exceptions to the duty of the judicial authority to order the immediate return of a child. Article 13 provides that a judicial authority is not
bound to order the return of a child if the person opposing the
child's return establishes that: (1) the person or institution having
custody of the child was not exercising it at the time of the abduction
or subsequently had consented to the abduction;' 7 2 or (2) there is a
grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm if returned.1 7 3 If the court finds that the child objects to
164 Id. art. 16.

165 See House Hearings,'supra note 2, at 366 (report of Prof. Bodenheimer to the Secretary of State, Jan. 1980).
166 Hague Convention, art. 12.
167 Id.
168 See House Hearings,supra note 2, at 368; Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at
694.
169 Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at 694.
170 See House Hearings,supra note 2,at 368; Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at
694.
171 See House Hearings, supra note 2, at 369. The U.S. delegation objected to the oneyear statute of limitations, noting that it may take up to two years to locate a child in this
country because there are no registration procedures like those in most European countries. Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at 694; Westgate, Kidsnatch Treaty Being
Studied, SINGLE PARENT, Mar. 1980, at 20, 21, reprinted in House Hearings,supra note 2, at 126,
127.
172 Hague Convention, art. 13(a).
173 Id. art. 13(b). Note the similarity between this provision and the emergency jurisdiction provision of the UCCJA. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. This is in-
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being returned and is of sufficient age and maturity for the court to
give weight to the child's opinion, it is not obligated to order the
74
child's return.
Article 20 provides that the child should not be returned "if this
would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms."' 7 5 While article 13 specifies that the burden of
proof is on the abductor to prove the first two exceptions, 76 it is not
77
clear who has the burden of proof under article 20.1

Under article 3 the applicant has the burden of proving he or
she has lawful custody of the child, and that the removal by the defendant was wrongful.' 7 8 The applicant is aided, however, by numerous provisions of the Convention. The court must consider the
social background of the child 179 and the laws of the requesting state
regarding child abduction. 180 The applicant is not required to file
any bond or other security' 8' and is entitled to the same legal aid
182
and advice as a national in the abducting State.
Article 21 provides that a person seeking to secure effective visitation rights may apply to the Central Authorities in the same man83
ner as an applicant for the return of a wrongfully removed child.'
The Central Authorities are obligated to "promote the peaceful enjoyment of access rights

.

.

.[and] shall take steps to remove

. . .

all

obstacles to the exercise of such rights."' 84 Access rights are not
defined in the Convention, but article 5(b) provides that they include
"the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other
tended to be a narrow ground for refusal to return a child and is not to be used to cover
the child's economic or educational loss. Article 13(b) refusal should be invoked only
when returning the child would place the child in an intolerable situation. Anton, The
Hague Convention on InternationalChild Abduction, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 537, 550-51 (1981).
174 Hague Convention, art. 13(b).. This exception was much debated at the Conference. Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at 696. The U.S. delegation disapproved
of it because it
places an inordinately heavy burden of responsibility on young children
which they are not psychologically equipped to handle, not to speak of the
pressures that may be brought to bear upon them by the person with whom
they live . . . and on whom they are fully dependent. Moreover, . . . [it]

would lead to a determination of the merits of the custody question ....
House Hearings, supra note 2, at 353.
175 Hague Convention, art. 20.

176 See Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 19, at 696; Anton, supra note 173, at 55051.
177 Farquhar, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction Comes to Canada, 4
CAN. J. FAM. L. 5, 24 (1983).
178 Anton, supra note 173, at 552.

179 Hague Convention, art. 13(b)(3).
180 Id. art. 14.
181 Id. art. 22.

182 Id. art. 25. See generally Anton, supra note 173, at 552-53.
183 Hague Convention, art. 21.
184 Id.
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than the child's habitual residence."' 8 5
Both the Strasbourg Convention and the Hague Convention offer solutions to the tragedy of international child abduction. The
language of the Hague Convention is straightforward. It is more
simplistic than the Strasbourg Convention 8 6 and provides for fewer
reservations and exceptions. Furthermore, the Strasbourg Convention may be signed and ratified only by the twenty-one member nations of the Council of Europe. The Hague Convention, on the
other hand, is open to other nations,' 8 7 including the United States,
Japan, and the Commonwealth nations.' 8 8 Only four nations have
ratified the Hague Convention: France, Switzerland, Portugal, and
all but two provinces of Canada.' 8 9
The most prominent drawbacks of the Hague Convention are
the one-year statute of limitations' 90 and the limited number of
states that have expressed an interest in the problem of international
child snatching by attending the Hague Conference. The nonparticipating nations provide numerous havens for potential child
abductors. '91
As discussed above, United States legislation has attempted to
curb the increasing frequency of interstate and international child
abductions. There remains an overwhelming need, however, for further solutions to the problem of parental child snatching overseas,
especially because the United States Government is practically powerless to secure the return of abducted children once they are located abroad. Ratification of the Hague Convention by a sufficiently
92
large number of countries should provide a solution.'
The United States signed the Hague Convention on December
23, 1981.193 During the first week of March 1985 family law profes-

sors and practitioners (the Study Group) will meet in California to
discuss and draft implementing legislation to submit to the congres185 Id. art. 5(b). See also Anton, supra note 173, at 554-55; Farquhar, supra note 177, at
27-28. The delegates felt that strict rules and procedures for visitation would be difficult

to devise and would provide for ill feeling between the parents rather than the requisite
goodwill for the proper exercise of visitation rights. See Anton, supra note 173, at 555.
186 See Anton, supra note 173, at 556; Comment, American Responses, supra note 2, at

447.
187 Hague Convention, art. 38.
188 See Comment, American Responses, supra note 2, at 448. Article 43 provides that the
Convention will become effective three months after three nations ratify it. Id.
189 Pfund Interview, supra note 1. Several other nations have expressed an interest in

ratifying it, e.g., United States, Greece, and Belgium. P. HOFF, supra note 11, at 10-11.
190 This should be a problem only in the United States. It takes an average of three
months to locate a missing person in Europe. Westgate, supra note 171, at 21. It is speculated it could take up to two years in the United States. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
191 See Lansing & Sherman, The Legal Response to Child Snatching, 7 J. Juv. L. 16, 27
(1983); S. ABRAHMS, supra note 7, at 119.
192 Pfund Interview, supra note 1.
193 Id.
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sional judicial committees contemporaneously with the Hague
Convention.

94

Originally, it was thought that the Hague Convention would be
self-executing. It has been determined by family law experts and the
State Department, however, that certain questions raised by the
Hague Convention are not reconcilable with United States law without some guidelines. 1 95 A major question is whether federal or state
courts will have jurisdiction over cases arising under the Hague Convention. Traditionally, federal courts have exercised jurisdiction
over cases involving treaty interpretation. 196 State courts, however,
have had virtually exclusive jurisdiction over domestic disputes because of the federal courts' refusal to hear such matters. 19 7 The
Study Group intends to discuss this question and in all likelihood will
suggest that initial jurisdiction be designated in state courts to hear
cases arising under the Convention.' 98
Another problem of implementation of the Hague Convention
in the United States is the establishment of a Central Authority.
Commentators have suggested the Justice Department or the Department of Health and Human Resources as possibilities.' 9 9 The
latter is the better choice because that agency manages the FPLS,
20 0
now used in connection with the PKPA.
Implementing legislation also should provide the proposed
Central Authority with funding to cover its administrative costs as
well as the cost of using the FPLS to assist in locating abducted
children. 20 1
194 Id.
195 See S. ABRAHMS, supra note 7, at 119-20.

See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 5, at 593; Foster & Freed, supra note 77, at 38.
This statute, however, gives federal courts not
exclusive jurisdiction, but concurrent jurisdiction. See Comment, American Responses, supra
note 2, at 471-72. See also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 592 (1858).
Recently, federal courts have been willing to hear tort cases arising from child snatchings that involve allegations of false imprisonment or intentional infliction of emotional
distress, which arguably arise out of domestic disputes. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834-35 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982). Tort actions
brought in federal courts under diversity jurisdiction can serve as deterrents to potential
international abductors. See, e.g., Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 21-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(court awarded over $30,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages
against relatives who aided a child abduction).
A further consideration is the conflict between the Hague Convention and the
UCCJA, which is state law. Treaties are a part of the supreme law of the land, U.S. CONST.
art. VI, § 2, and therefore, the Hague Convention's statutes of limitations and exceptions
would be "read into the international provisions of the UCCJA." Bodenheimer, supra note
150, at 112.
198 Pfund Interview, supra note 1.
196

197 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982).

199

See, e.g., R. CROUCH, supra note 11, at 93.

See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. The Study Group intends to discuss
the possibility of the use of the FPLS in implementing the Hague Convention's requirement that the Central Authority assist in locating abducted children. Pfund Interview,
supra note 1. See Comment, American Responses, supra note 2, at 470-71.
201 Pfund Interview, supra note 1. Other possible implementation suggestions include
200
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III. Conclusion
This comment has described two United States attempts to curtail the burgeoning problem of international child snatching. The
UCCJA effectively addresses the problem of interstate child snatching by those parents who remove their children in an attempt at forum-shopping for a favorable custody determination. The PKPA
supplants the UCCJA by adding the "muscle" of the FBI and the
Justice Department to aid in locating and apprehending the abducting parent and the children. As the Justice Department becomes
more involved in parental child kidnapping, the PKPA should also
serve as a tremendous deterrent to would-be child snatchers.
The United States legislation, however, is not without problems.
The UCCJA only addresses those cases in which the parents seek to
legitimize the wrongdoing, and therefore, parents who abduct with
no intention of pursuing a new custody determination are not affected. Additionally, the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA invoke the trial judge's discretion, and therefore, are subject to abuse.
The PKPA also has weaknesses. The Justice Department can be
called in as a last resort only if the state has a felony parental child
abduction statute. Furthermore, the FPLS will aid only in locating
the absconding parents in limited circumstances.
Neither the PKPA nor the UCCJA is particularly helpful in cases
of international abduction. It is clear, therefore, that there is an immediate need for an international agreement that addresses the
problems peculiar to international child snatching. Although there
are merits to both the Strasbourg Convention and the Hague Convention, the Hague Convention affords the most efficient solutions.
Pragmatically, more nations will be able to ratify and thereby enjoy
the protection afforded by the Hague Convention, thus limiting the
number of potential havens for child snatchers.
The Hague Convention provides some solutions to problems of
international child snatching that are not addressed by United States
legislation. Because of the severe problems encountered by United
States citizens in seeking .return of their children abducted overseas,
the United States should ratify the Hague Convention as soon as
practicable. 20 2 Furthermore, ratification by the United States should
serve as a catalyst to other nations to ratify the Convention. Widethe reservation of court costs under article 42 of the Convention. The Study Group intends to place the burden of paying legal expenses on the wrongdoer, which can be or-

dered under both the UCCJA and the PKPA. Id. The possibility that the United States will
extend the Hague Convention protection until the child reaches 18 will be discussed by

the Study Group. Id.
202 One-half of the active files of unsolved international child abductions reported to
the State Department involve child snatchings to the countries represented at the Hague

Conference in 1980. This further demonstrates the need for ratification of the Convention. Pfund Interview, supra note 1.
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spread adoption of the Hague Convention is essential if it is to be
successful in its objectives.
-BARBARA

R.
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